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[L. A. No. 21512. ID Bank. Mar. 6, 1951.)

ERIC L. PRIDONOFF, Appellant, v. ZLATKO BALOKOVICH et al.• Respondents.
[1] Libel-Actionable Words-Words Tending to Injure in Occupation.-An article is libelous which eharges that onf' described therein as a member of an American Embassy enjZ'aged ,
in such flagrant espionage that the United States honored
a l'f!quest for his recall, aince it implies that he is not fit for
his position and tends to injure him in his occupation.
[2a,2b] Id.-Damages.-ln an action for damages for publication
of a libel in a newspaper, plaintiff's failure to allege a demand
for a correction and that no correction was published precludes
recovery of general or exemplary damages. (Civ. Code, § 48a.)
[3] Id.-Damages.-Notwithatanding that an action for a libel
published in a newspaper is against the &ctual author of the
article rather than the publisher, Civ. Code, § 48a, precludes
recovery of more than special damages unless plaintiif serves
a notice on the publisher demanding retraction, and no retraction is published.
[4] Id.-Oomplaint-Damages.-In a libel action, plaintiff's allegations of special damages are sufficiently specific to sustain
a cause of action therefor, where he alleges that as a result
of the publication of the libel he lost employment with a named
employer, for a specified period, and to his damage in a named
amount.
[5] Pleading - Manner - Information and Belief. - Plaintiff who
seeks special damages in a libel action for loss of employment
may allege on information and belief the amount of his financial loss, and that it was caused by the libel, since such facts
are not necessarily within his personal knowledge and may
be ascertainable only from declarations of others. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 446.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Ccurt of Los
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
[1) See 16 Oal.Jur. 45; sa Am.Jur. 80. Retraction as affecting
right of action or amount of damages for libel or slander, note,
13 A.L.R. 794. See. also, 16 Oa1.Jur. 128; 33 Am.Jur. 193.
[5] See 21 Oal.Jur. 48; 41 Am.Jur. S16.
McK. Dig. References: P 1 Libel, US; [2, 3] Libel, 127; [4:1
Libel, i 61; [6] Pleading, 136.
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Action for damages for libel. Judgment of dismissal on
IUStaining demurrer to third amended complaint without
leave to amend, reversed with directions.
Paul Barksdale D 'Orr and Brodie E. Ahlport for Appellant.
Edward Mosk, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne
and Stuan Kadison for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his action for libel, entered pursuant to an order
sustaining without leave to amend defendants' demurrer to
his third amended complaint.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that ,. defendants together
composed, wrote and caused to be printed and published, of
and concerning the plaintiff, in a daily newspaper known as
'Narodni Glasnik,' and distributed to, and which was read by,
large numbers of people in the County of Los Angeles, and
in other parts of the State of California, and numerous other
cities and counties throughout the United States, the following matter:
" 'Eric Pridonoff, while one of the American Embassy in
Belgrade, was caught carrying on dagrant espionage activities. The Yugoslav government requested his recall and we
recalled him. When Pridonoff got back to the United States;
he wrote a series of articles for the Hearst press violently
attacking the Yugoslav government and intimating clearly
that if the Yugoslav people would revolt against their government, we would help them. These articles were mimeographed both in English and Serbo-Croatian, and distributed
through the American Reading Room in Belgrade. We read
.them ourselves while we were there.' ..
In the first count of his complaint plaintiif alleged that
defendants wrote and published the allegedly libelous article,
that all the statements therein, with the exception of the statement that plaintiff .was a member of the American Embassy,
were false, that defendants knew the statements were false
and caused their publication out of malice and ill will toward
plaintiff with intention to injure, disgraee; and defame him,
and that as a result of the publication of the statements
plaintiff suffered general damages in the amount of $100,000.

-

~)

790

PRmoNOFP' tJ. BALOKOVICH

[36 C.2d

In the second count plaintiff alleged that because of certain
circumstances the statements wcre given a particularly defamatory interpretation by the persons who read them. It
was further alleged that plaintiff "is informed and believes
and therefore alleges that asa direct and proximate result
of said false and malicious publication, and its consequent
injury to his reputation as a man, and as a consulting engineer, he suffered special damages in this, that he lost employment, between July I, 1947, and February I, 1~48, as an
engineer with Parsons Aerojet Company, of Los Angeles,
California, and compensation $5,000." Plaintiff prayed for
judgment in the amounts of $100,000 general damages, $100,000 exemplary damages, and $5,000 special damages.
Libel is defined as .. a false and unprivileged publication by
writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ. Code, § 45.) Defendants contend that the
article was not libelous in describing plaintiff as being engaged
in espionage for the United States; that it is pruper and
praiseworthy for a person to be a spy for his own country.
Had the article said only that plaintiff was engaged in espionagefor the United States, defendants' contentiun might
have merit. [1] The article went further, however. It
described plaintiff as one of the American Embassy, a person
who should not engage in espionage, and charged that nevertheless he engaged in such flagrant espionage activity that
his recall was requested and that the United States honored
the request. The pUblication thus carried the clear implication that plaintiff was unfit for his job as a representative
of the United States serving abroad. It had a direct tendency
to injure him in his occupation and was accordingly libelous.
[2&] Plaintiff cannot recover general or exemplary damages, however. Civil Code, section 48a, provides:
•• In any action for damages for the pUblication of a libel
in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff
shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher,
at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of·
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed
to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected.
Said notice and demand must be served within 20 days after
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knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements
claimed to be libelous."
[3] The plain language of the statute governs •• any action
for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper."
(Italics added.) Even though plaintiff's action is for the
publication of a libel in a newspaper, he contends that by
virtue of the provision requiring service of the demand for
correction on the publisher the statute applies only to the
publisher and not to his employees, columnists, and other
authors. (See Comer v. Louisville etc. Railroad Co., 151
Ala. 622 (44 So. 676, 677].) Since his action is against the
authors of the alleged libel and not against the newspaper
publisher he concludes that section 48a has no application.
It does not follow, however, that because the person upon
whom the notice to retract must be served is the publisher
of the newspaper, the statute applies to him alone. Reporters,
columnists, authors, critics, editors, and the publisher are
all participants in newspaper publications. When error is
made, however, it is the publisher who has power to make
correction. In providing for the substitution of a retraction
for general and exemplary damages it was reasonable, therefore, for the Legislature to provide that the notice should be
served upon him. The retraction provides as adequate a
substitute for general and exemplary damages in the case of
a suit against the author as in one against the newspaper
publisher himself. [2b] Since plaintiff does not allege a
demand for the publication of a correction or the refusal
thereof, section 48a precludes recovery of general or exemplary
damages arising from the publication of the alleged libel.
(Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35
Cal.2d 121 (216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252J.)
Plaintiff does allege, however, that he has suffered special
damages as a result of the publication of the alleged libel.
Section 48a permits their recovery even though no correction
has been demanded or refused. The general demurrer was
therefore properly sustained only if the allegation of special
damages is insufficient to sustain a cause of action therefor.
Special damages are "all damages whicb plaintiff alleges
and proves that be bas suffered in respect to his property,
business, trade, profession or occupation, including such
amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has
expended as a result of the allcg('d libel, lind no other."
(Civ. Code, § 48a.) If special damages are claimed, as in the
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present case, for mjury to the plaintiff's trade, profession,
or occupation, the uature and extent of the loss must be
specifically set forth. "To prevent a surprise on the defendant it is the geueral rule that the plaintiff must state in his
complaint the particular damage which he has sustained or
be will not be permitted to give evidence of it." (Skaggs v.
Wiley, 108 Cal.App. 429, 434 [292 P. 132) ; Peabody v. Barham. 52 Cal.App.2d 581, 585 [126 P.2d 668); Lejeune v.
General Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal.App. 404, 418-419 [18
P .2d 429].) A general allegation of the loss of a prospective
employment, sale, or profit will not suffice. (Peabody v.
Barham, supra; Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 473-474
[29 N.W. 68, 59 Am.Rep. 335]; Denney v. Northwestern
Credit Assn;, 55 Wash. 331, 333 [104 P. 769, 25 L.R.A.N.S.
1021]; DeWitt v. Scarlett, 113 Md. 47, 51-52 [77 A. 271);
7'ower v. Crosby, 214 App.Div. 392 [212 N.Y.S.219, 220);
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225,237 [23 L.Ed. 308).)
[4] Plaintiff's allegation of special damage is sufficiently
specific. He alleges that as a result of the publication of the
alleged libel he has lost employment with a specific elDployer,
the Parsons Aerojet Company, for a specified period, to his
damage in the amount of $5,000. Defendants are thereby
informed of the exact nature of the claim of special damages
and afforded an opportunity to prepare a defense against it.
That is all that is required of the allegation.
[6] Defendants contend, however, that the allegation is
insufficient for the reason that the special damages are alleged
only on information and belief. Plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his
personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to
believe that the allegations are true. (Code Civ. Proc., § 446 ;
Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 206 [92 P.
184]; North v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, 2 Cal.2d 55,
58-59 [39 P.2d 199); Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo,
64 Cal.App.2d 858, 865 [149 P.2d 397}; Thompson v. Sutton,
60 Cal.App.2d 272, 279 [122 P.2d 976).) Plaintiff would
ordinarily learn that he lost employment because of the libel
from the declarations of others. It is therefore appropriate
for him to allege such matters on information and belief.
(Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, supra.)
HaU v. James, 79 Ca1.App. 433. 435-436 [249 P. 876], does
Dot compel a contrary result. In that case the court held
insuffieit'nt an alleJ.!ation on Information and belief of the
tUDount of damages sustaiueJ by plaintiff as the result of
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defendant's breach of contract. The court recognized that
matters that are not within the personal knowledge of the
pleader may be alleged on information and belief, but stated
that "plaintiff is certainly in a position to know better than
any informant the financial loss he sustained by reason of
the breach of contract." (Hall v. James, 79 Cal.App. at
436 [249 P. 876].) In the present case, the amount of financial loss plaintiff has sustained and the fact that the loss was
caused by the libel are (not necessarily within his personal
knowledge, but may be ascertainable only from the declarations of others and may therefore be alleged on information
and belief.
The judgment. is reversed and the cause remanded with
directions to overrule the demurrer and to allow defendants
to answer.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the reversal of the judgment of
dismissal, but do not agree with the law stated in the majority
opInIon. The majority decision holds that, by implication
at least, section 48a of the Civil Code is valid and that it
applies to the author of a newspaper article although he has
no connection with the newspaper or its publisher; that is,
that unless a correction or retraction is demanded and refused,
only special damages may be recovered against the author for
the publication of a libelous article in a newspaper. I cannot
agree with that proposition ferr two reasons: (1) Section 48a,
which grants to newspapers immunity from liability for libelous publications, is invalid, and its invalidity is brought into
sharp focus when it is extended to the author of the libelous
article. (2) Section 48a does not apply to authors.
.
The validity of section 48a has been befor,e this court heretofore (Werner v. 80tLthern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 35
Ca1.2d 121 [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252]). I filed a dissenting opinion in that case, and the Supreme Court of the
United States allowed an appeal, but a settlement was made
of plaintiff's claim and the appeal has been dismissed. I
adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in the Werner
case, but it is apparent that the broadened scope now given
to section 48a by the majority opinion in this case emphasizes
its unconstitutionality and calls for further discussion. Under
the construction now given to RE'<'tion 488, 8 correction or
retraction would have to be Ilellulllllell of an author of an
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article if it appeared in a newspaper, but if the identical
statements appeared in an article published in a magazine
or in pamphlet form there would be no immunity. By what
legerdemain is an author immunized from general and exemplary damages when his libelous article is published il1 a
newspaper, but is not so immunized when sllch article is published in a magazine, pamphlet or other form of publication'
What possible basis could exist for so classifying authors of
libelolls articles? These ql1estions are not answered in the
majority opinion.
In bolding there was no denial of equal protection, the
maj()rit~, said in fhl' Werner case (p. 132): "The Legislature
conld rea!':onably conclude that drfamation suits against newspapers and radio stations constituted the most conspicuous
example of the danger it sought to preclude. It is not prohibited by the equal protection clause from striking the evil
where it is felt most.
Similarly in this case, we cannot
say that the Legislature could not reasonably conclude that
bpcanse of the business they are engaged in, newspapers and
radio stations are the most frequent objects of defamation
actions and that the danger of ex('Pssive damages in actions
against them is greatest becausr of their reputed ability to
pay. See, Morris. Inadvertent Newspaper Ubel and Retraction, 32 m.L.Rev. 36,43; ct., Packard v. Moore, 9 Ca1.2d 571,
fi78-580 r7] P .2d 9221, discussing rule of inadmissibility of
eviilence that defendant is insured in personal injury actions.
"Moreover, in balancin!! the danger of recoveries of excesRi,'p !!,eneral damages against leaving plaintiffs with no effective remedy for injury to their repntations, the Legislature
could properly take into consideration the fact that a retraction widely c1rculated by a newspaper or radio siaNon would
have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an individual
and could thus class newspapers and radio stations apart ..
"Section 48a may also be sl1!':tained under the equal protection elause on th(' theory that its purpose is to encourage
the dissemination of news. Although it extends its protection to those who may deliberately and maliciously disseminate libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it
was necessary to go so far effectively to protect thoRe who in
good faith and without malice inadvertently publis71 defamatory IItatements." (Emphasis addpd.) Thus it is seen that
several thingR Rre stressed 8S a basis for the classification
approved by the majority in thE' WernPT ease-the L('gislatare could decide that unfounded suits against newspapers,
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that is, the entity or publisher thereof, are of more frequent
occurrence with the possible evil of their being mulcted for
excessive damages because of their reputed wealth. But,
here we do not have a suit against a newspaper as such, or
the publisher. It is against an individual-the author of the
libel. Merely because of the circumstance that may have
caused it to reach the pages of a newspaper instead of a magazine or pamphlet is not justification for exonerating the
author. Authors do not fall in the class of newspaperspublishers who are said to be conspicuously subject to unfounded suits. Hence the classification cannot be justified
as to authors on that ground. Furthermore, as seen from the
foregoing quotation from the majority opinion in the Werner
case, it is also said that the Legislature could find that those
engaged in the "business" of operating newspapers are the
most common objects of defamation actions because of their
reputed ability to pay. Manifestly that reasoning cannot apply to authors, and it also indicates (later discussed) the inapplicability of section 48a to authors. They are not in the
newspaper business and their work might appear in a newspaper even without their knowledge. It is also said in the
quotation from the Werner case, supra, that newspapers are
more widely circulated and thus a retraction would be more
effective. An author as such has DO circulating medium,
for be publishes nothing, and a demand upon him to make a
retraction would be idle, for he could not compel the newspaper to publish it and he has no medium in which to publish
it himself. Finally, it is said that the classification should
extend to those who inadvertently publish defamatory statements to accomplish their objective in the dissemination of
news. An author is not disseminating news. He is not operating a newspaper with the accompanying necessity of speed iri
bringing news to the attention of the public.
It should be clear, therefore, that none of the reasons for
the approval of the classification sanctioned in the Werner
case fit the author of the defamatory statements here involved.
All of those reasons are pertinent only to the newspaper
business-a publisher. They do not justify a different liability merely because the defamation appears in a newspaper
regardless of who prepared it. The ramifications arising from
a contrary view are disturbingly many. An advertiser, a
writer of a letter, a columnist and similar contributors to
newspapers would thus have their liability restricted to special damages.
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The Legislature did not intend by section 48a to exten
protection against actions for libel beyond the publisher 0
a newspaper. It will be remembered from the wording 0
the section that a pUblication of a libel "in" a newspaper i
covered. That might indicate that the only requirement wa
that it appear in a newspaper, but "in" may be used in the
sense of "by." (Beatty v. Hughes, 61 Cal.App.2d 489 [143
P.2d 110).) Thus the publication must be by a newspaper
to come within the section and the other provisions of the l
section make that conclusion inescapable. A correction or
retraction must be demanded of the· publisher and refused to \
authorize the recovery of general damages. Upon whom is the \
demand made! The publisher. Where' At the place of
publication. Plainly, the publisher is the operator of the \
newspaper. He is not necessarily the author. The author',
may not be in the publishing business. He does not neces-:
sarily have a place of publication. If "publish" is given a'
broad connotation to mean any place the libel is circulated,
it would be impossible for the defamed person to know where .
or upon whom he had to serve his demand. Neither the newspaper operator nor the author would be in all places the
paper was circulated. It can only mean, therefore, that the
publisher is the operator of the newspaper and the place
of publication is the site where it is produced. Moreover,
the retraction must be published in a regular issue of the
paper. Only the publisher issues regular editions. It would
avail him nothing to make a demand on the author. as he could
, not compel a retraction by the paper. Suppose the newspaper
is published out of this state and where no correction or retraction is required, but the author resides in this state. Must
a retraction be demanded before suit against the author'
Comer v. Louisville ~ N. R. Co., 151 Ala. 622 [44 So. 676).
is precisely in point. There the statute was similar to our
section 48a, and the defendant had prepared an article which
he paid the newspaper to publish. It was held that the statute
did not apply to such person, the court saying: ". . . we are
left to the wording of the statute and its apparent object for
our guide in its interpretation. The statute provides that the
notice shall be served in writing 'on the publisher or publishers of said newspaper,' and no provision is made for serving notice on any other pefson. The act seems to be for.
the purpose of preventing litigation in regard to those articles which may have found their way into the columns of
the newspapers by inadvertence or without knowledge or care-

)
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ful scrutiny on the part of the publishers. We know tlJa t 1he
modern daily paper, with its numerous reporters, gat hl'l"Ill/-!
news from every quarter, and its busy elllployees, wurkillg'
until late into the night to place the latest uews before the
readers early in the morning is peculiarly liable to beillg
inadvertently led into trouble in these matters, and it !;(>l'IlIS
a proper classification to regulate this class ()f libel suits as
applied to the publishers of newspapers. But with the indio
vidual, who prepares his article and pays for its publication,
no such reason exists. For these reasons we hold that this
provision of the statute does not apply to the defendants in
this suit. It is true that the Supreme Court of ~orth Caro·
lina applied a libel law somewhat similar to our statnte to an
individual who was sued for a libel published in a newspaper;
but it is to be noted that the partiCUlar point was not raisC'll
in that case, and, besides, the wording of the statute was diff·cr·
ent, in that the North Carolina statute required that the
notice should be served 'on the defendant or defendants,' auLi
not on the publisher of the newspaper, as in our statute.
Williams v. Smith, 134 N.C. 249, 46 S.B. 502." The same
trend has been evidenced in other cases. (Clementson v.
Minnesota Tribune Co., 45 Minn. 303 [47 N.W. 781], stating
that the purpose of the statute was to reqnire !,;pryiee 011 the
publisher of the newspaper; Thorso'Tt v. Albert Lea Publish.
Co., 190 Minn. 200 [251 N.W. 177, 90 A.L.R. 116!)j, proteetioH
is for newspapers because of the difficulties of preveJltillg'
mistakes j Lydiard v. Wingaie, 131 Minn. 355 [1!'i5 N.W. 212).)
That the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained
from the words it uses is clearly stated by tIll' author of the
majority opinion in this case as author of the llwjority llpill'
ion in People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [217 P.2<l 11.
Re there said: "The will of the Legislature mllst be deter·
mined from the statutes; intentions callHot be ascribed to it
at odds with the intentions articulated in the statutes.
The court turns first to the words themselves for the nnswer .
. . . Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that SIl·
perimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, remin<il'J"s that
whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it \Va!'; wit·
tingly undertaken and not to be disregarde(l." EWll if the
statute is snsceptible of either constrnctioll. that )!i\"l'1l it by
the majority decision raises seriolls eOllstitlltiollnl questions
not considered in the 'Werner rusp and hellt·(, th(' I'slablisheo
rule applies that: "It is a well·rl'coguizeu canon of interpre·
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tation that, where a legislative enactment is susceptib1r of
two constructions, one consistent and the other inconsistent
with the provisions of the constitution, such enactment should
be so constrned as to make it harmonious with the constitution
and comport with the legitimate powers of the legislature."
(5 Cal.Jur. 615.)
Being of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of
action for special. general and exemplary damages. the judgment should be reversed with directions to the trial court to
overrule the demurrer and allow the defendants to answer
as to all the issues presented by the complaint.
SCBA UER, J .-1 concur generally in the views and eonelusion reached by Mr. Justice Carter. The vice in section
48a which seems to me most lethal, as I endeavored to point
out in my dissent in Werner v. Southern Col. etc. Newspapers
(1950),35 Cal.2d 12], 150 et seq. [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d
252J,J is its licensing of two arbitrarily selected groups to
ma]jcious'~' engage in deliberately false libels.
The courts of last resort, both state and national, bave unremittingly given staunch support to the constitutional freedoms of speech and press as against prior restraints. I am
one who has been zealous to that end; but I had thought that
the injustices which sometimes must flow from lack of prior restraints would be deterred. mitigated or compensated by subsequent responsibility. general and punitive. for abuses of
the right. 2 Then in the Werner case, I found the state Legislature giving. and a majority of this court npholding, prior
absolution to thE' selerted groups of newspapers and radio
broadcasters as against subsequent rE'sponsibility for either
general or punitive damages and regardless of whether the
librl or slander werE' inadvertent or knowingly and maliciol1sl~' false.
'Whetht'1" tht' majority holrling in Wnner will stand on review by
thf' Unitt'rl !';tnt.es ~upri'mt' Court has not as yet been determined.
(Appt'ol to {lnit.t'd ~tntes Supremt' Court filed Aug. 25, 1950 f19 U.S.
Law Wt'ek 30741; prohnhlp. jurillitit'tion noted Oct. 16, 1950 19 U.s.
Law Wrek. !\10". 14. 19fiO. (ndu, p. 20); appeal dismissed on motion
of l'ou.nsel for appellant .Jan. 2, 1951 fIP U.S. Law Week. Feb. 6,
1951. ~upplE'nll'nt to Index. p. 111.)
·Californh. Constitution, article I. st'ction 9: "ETery citizeD may
freely IIpenll, write. and puhlish bi~ aentiments on al1 subjeets, being
responsihle for the abusE' of that right . . . •"
Ch·n Code, 1IP'(·tioTl 3294: "(Wjhere the defendant haa beeD guilty
of
mlllict'
the plaintiff, in additioTl to the actual clamagee,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of p11lliall.
ini the dcft'Ddant."

Mar. 1951]

YOUNG V. HAMPTON
136 C.2d 799; 228 P.2d 1)

799

Now I find the majority of the court extending their eon·
struction and effective application of the legislative act (Civ
Code, § 48a) to immunize the author of a slander or libel,
whether inadvertent or deliberate. as well as the newspaper
or broadcasting agency which gives circulation to the calumny.
An author, my prevailing associates hold, may deliberately
and maliciously compose the vil('Rt calumny. and if he can
procnre its publication in 8 newspaper or by a broadcasting
company,by paid advertisement or otherwise, he can come
within the encouraging arms of section 48a and repose securely
immune from either general or punitive damages.
Does the spawning of such a doctrine bring pride to the
free press of America' Or, perhaps, does the insistence of
the newspapers and broadcasters on having something very
akin to foolproof statutory immunity from liability in all
libcl-slander cases, just and unjust, rather than leaving to
the cOllrts their protection as against nnfonnded claims, stem
in some measure from the very fact that a conrt of last resort
which will sustain such a doctrine may be found'

